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2I. Introduction
Kagan’s “Of Paradise and Power,” appearing first in shorter form as an essay in Policy Review in 
Summer 2002,1 was expanded because of its immense popularity into a 102 page book examining the 
growing “ideological gap”2 in the way Europe and the United States view world politics. Kagan begins in 
his chapter The Power Gap by placing Europe and the US in their respective historical contexts. Whereas 
post World War II Europe was both weak and anxious to forget its bloody past, he argues, the US 
emerged from the war strong and dominating. 3  Against this background, he proposes in his chapter 
Psychologies of Power and Weakness that “Europe’s relative weakness has understandably produced a 
powerful European interest in building a world where military strength and hard power matter less than 
economic and soft power.”4  After further elaborating on American strength and European weakness in 
the context of the Kosovo conflict in his chapter Hyperpuissance,5 Kagan proposes the central thesis of 
his book in his chapters The Postmodern Paradise and The World America Made, that “Europe’s 
evolution into its present state occurred under the mantle of the U.S. security guarantee and could not 
have occurred without it.”6  Having established this thesis about Europe’s past, Kagan turns to the present 
in his chapter Is it Still ‘The West?’  Noting that European strategy and interests focus increasingly around 
the EU and less around NATO, he questions whether it is still possible to view Europe and the United 
States as a cohesive unit under such titles as “The West.”7  Finally, he turns to the future in Adjusting to 
Hegemony, concluding that the only way to resolve the difference of ideologies between norm-based 
Europe and militarily strong United States is for Europe to simply “readjust to the new reality of 
American hegemony.”8
It is easy to see why Kagan’s book was so popular:  It is an important, controversial, and thought-
provoking book across many disciplines, including international relations, political science, history, and 
world politics.  But, one discipline is notably lacking from Kagan’s analysis:  that of international law.  It 
is therefore the purpose of this book review to provide a counterpoint to Kagan’s approach, an approach 
wholly based in international relations theory, by offering a response based in international law.
1
 Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 POLICY REVIEW (June, 2002).
2
 ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER:  AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD 
ORDER 11 (2003).
3 Id. at 12-18.
4 Id. at 37. 
5 Id. at 42-53.
6 Id. at 72.  
7 Id. at 85.
8 Id. at 97.
3Part II responds to Kagan’s perception of power using the assumptions of international law, and 
contrasts his definition of power to that of several international legal scholars.  Part III places Kagan’s
realist approach in a broader context of international relations (hereinafter “IR”) and international law 
(hereinafter “IL”) theory, beginning with a discussion of challenges to realism, and concluding with an 
examination of the growing body of literature which posits that the fields of international law and 
international relations are merging (hereinafter “integrationist” literature).  Part IV returns to the question 
of power, examining ways in which Kagan’s book challenges international lawyers to consider how 
military and doctrinal power interact, an inquiry which is particularly interesting in the European context, 
where doctrinal power is stronger than military power.  The review concludes in Part V by agreeing with 
Kagan that the current rift between the US and Europe is likely to grow, but disagreeing on the result:  
Whereas Kagan foresees a world where the all-powerful US eventually disregards Europe, its former 
friend which is no longer of any strategic use to US interests, this review foresees a world where the 
powerful rules-based society of the European Union will continue to grow, creating a potent counter-
balance to the US.
II. Varying Conceptions of Power:  An International Law 
Response
As the title suggests, Kagan’s book examines the different notions of power in the USA and 
Europe.  But, although Kagan presents himself as a relatively neutral observer,9 his entire book is written 
from the perspective of an American realist international relations scholar.10  An equally valid and 
academically rich set of assumptions about the meaning of “power” exist within the discipline of 
international law, and when Kagan’s topics are re-examined under this alternative paradigm a vastly 
different picture emerges.  This Part will re-examine the notion of power from an IL perspective, 
concluding that because Europeans may view the world more like the international lawyer and less like 
Kagan, his conclusions regarding European policy choices surrounding military power may also need to 
be re-examined.
Kagan states that Europe’s “mission, if it has a mission beyond the confines of Europe, is to 
oppose power.”11  But this assertion is heavily laden with Kagan’s particular definition of power which 
9 Id. at 4 (claiming it is easier for him to see the contrast between the American and European international 
approaches “as an American living in Europe.”).
10
 David P. Calleo, Power, Wealth and Wisdom, THE NATIONAL INTEREST 1 (Summer, 2003) (“The book is 
well worth reading, not least for insight into what the intelligent and civilized American neo-conservative thinks 
about the world.”).
11 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 68.
4permeates his book:  To Kagan power seems to come in only one variety, military power.12  But, many 
international lawyers would disagree with this constrained definition of power, preferring a much broader 
definition of power, such as the following offered by Professor Byers:
Power is the ability of one actor to compel or significantly influence the behavior of 
another. It may be applied through the use or threat of force, through economic incentives 
or penalties, or through a variety of social pressures. It may be derived from a number of 
different sources, including military capabilities, wealth or moral authority. It may be 
augmented or constrained by concepts, values, institutions and rules. It is above all a 
relational concept, in that the ability to compel or influence always depends on the 
relative abilities of the different actors concerned either to apply or resist pressure.”13
Paul Kahn of the Yale Law School also notes the importance of power in international affairs, but 
cautions against viewing power and law as opposites:
When we compare the international to the domestic order, the balance between power 
and law tilts dramatically in favor of power--meaning the capacity to advance state ends 
independently of the norms and procedures of law. Many contemporary observers, 
however, believe that this situation is rapidly changing, as international law gains 
normative strength and institutional presence. This opposition of power and law--and the 
trade-off between them--offers too simple a view of the relationship between these 
concepts. This is not just because a great power may often find it in its interests to 
support the international legal order.   That is no doubt true, but it still assumes that 
power and law can be measured against each other, i.e., on a single scale of state 
interests. The situation we confront, however, challenges the idea that any such scale 
exists.14
12 See, e.g., Id. at 33 (minimizing the influence of “soft” economic power compared to “hard” military power); Id. at 
38 (using the general term “weak” to mean “militarily weak” and the general term “strong” to imply military 
strength); Id. at 41 (claiming Europeans are not “wielding power” simply because they are not wielding military 
power).  Realists have been criticized for their narrow conception of power in the past.  For example, Koskenniemi
notes that realists “fail to see to what extent their determining concepts such as ‘interest,’ ‘power,’ or ‘security’ are 
themselves defined and operative within a normative context.”  Martti Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective 
Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 455, 465  (1996).
13
 Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules:  Customary International Law from an Interdisciplinary 
Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 113  (1995).  Professor Anne Orford criticizes Byer’s work for not 
acknowledging that “the work of international relations and international legal scholars in describing and explaining 
the world is itself an exercise of power, rather than a mere observation of the way in which powerful actors such as 
'sovereign states' behave,”  Anne Orford, Review Essay:  Positivism and the Power of International Law: Custom, 
Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law by Michael Byers, 24 
MELBOURNE U. L.R. 502, 520 (2000), and arguing that “[a]t least since the publication of Edward Said's 
Orientalism,  such an understanding of the role of knowledge producers in fields that engage with 'other' countries 
and cultures has been difficult to sustain.”  Id. at 526.  In addition, Orford broadens the discussion of power yet 
again, noting that “[t]he work of feminist scholars, postcolonial scholars and queer theorists provides a way of 
thinking about the relationship between sovereignty and the operation of power in modern societies that differs from 
that developed by positivists. The model of power that emerges from these areas departs from a conception of power 
as a commodity or thing held by particularly powerful entities like states. Scholars in those fields have been arguing 
for decades that apparently organisational and public issues, such as militarism, imperialism, law and monetarism, 
are deeply personal, while the personal issues of subjectivity and experience are deeply political.”  Id. at 522.
14
 Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony and International Law:  Speaking Law to Power:  Popular Soverignty, 
Human Rights, and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2000).
5In addition, a large number of human rights lawyers would disagree with Kagan’s notion of 
absolute sovereignty within which his idea of military power is based.15  After tracing the development of 
international law from post-World War II state-centered positivism through to the development of the 
individual centered international human rights movement,16 Professor Kahn suggests that it is this latter 
development, international human rights based outside of or antithetical to the concept of state 
sovereignty,17 which left the United States in an impossible position with respect to international law:  
“[W]hile law functions in the United States as an expression of popular sovereignty that chooses to invest 
itself in particular rights, contemporary international law has little to do with popular sovereignty and 
gains its legitimacy from the defense of rights.”18  Accepting Kahn’s analysis, Kagan is correct that the 
US fears usurpation of its sovereignty.  But, rather than frame the issue as a divide between the US and 
Europe, it is perhaps more accurately framed within the global growth and increased importance of 
international human rights law.19  To do this, however, would be to admit the importance of international
law, something Kagan is unwilling to do.
Unfortunately, Kagan’s assumptions about power permeate even his analysis of European policy 
choices surrounding military power, leading to some potentially erroneous conclusions.  For example, one 
of Kagan’s primary arguments, presented in his chapter Psychologies of Power and Weakness, is that 
“Europe’s relative weakness has understandably produced a powerful European interest in building a 
world where military strength and hard power matter less than economic and soft power.”20  But, this 
15 Id. at 6 (“[T]here are individuals, both here and abroad, who no longer understand themselves within the forms of 
our national civic religion of popular sovereignty and law's rule. They see themselves largely as consumers, not 
citizens, and members of a cosmopolitan civil society that has liberated itself from the politics of nations and the 
claims of popular sovereignty. It may be that their world is the future world, a world in which the logic of human 
rights may fully realize itself. We stand to that world in about the same way that the nineteenth century secularists 
stood to religious communities. It was too early then to proclaim the death of God; it is too early today to proclaim 
the death of the state.”).
16 Id. at 10-16.  See also Id. at 5 (“For a long time, this combination of views fit easily into the reigning dualist 
paradigm of international law. On this view, the origin of international law was the consent of states. Although the 
modes of expression varied across the domestic and international contexts, both contexts shared the idea that law 
expressed the sovereign will. This era of international law is ending.  The language of the international law scholar 
today is no longer the language of sovereignty; rather, it is that of the demise of sovereignty. The sovereign state is 
increasingly perceived as the problem to be overcome.”).
17 Id. at 12 (“The rhetoric of human rights provided a legal ground by which to overcome claims of state 
sovereignty.).
18 Id. at 6.
19 Id. at 14.  This theory is consistent with the recent scholarly work on neo-liberalism.  See infra note 73 and 
accompanying text.  Reus-Smit notes that ““[b]ecause liberal theory stresses the primacy of individuals and private 
groups in shaping political and legal outcomes, the traditional ordering of international law, which privileges the 
international public law of interstate relations, is turned on its head, with law that directly regulates individuals and 
groups (the first two tiers) taking precedence. Furthermore, within international public law, law that most directly 
affects individual-state relations is given priority, thus placing human rights law at the ‘core’ of international law.”  
Reus- Smit, The Strange Death of Liberal International Relations Theory, 12 E.J.I.L. 573, 586 (2001).
20 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 37. Kagan appeals to a popular audience by making this argument through a series of 
simplistic analogies in which the complexities of inter-state relations are personified.  For example, he employs a 
6argument is logically flawed:  As Kagan himself admits, Europeans could quite easily increase their 
military budgets to meet or even exceed that of the United States, but they choose not to do so.21
Similarly, Kagan asks “If Europe’s strategic culture today places less value on hard power and military 
strength and more value on such soft-power tools as economics and trade, isn’t it partly because Europe is 
militarily weak and economically strong?”22  But, Kagan’s question puts the cart before the horse:  
Europe does not prefer “soft” power because it is militarily weak; it chooses to be militarily weak because 
it prefers soft power.  Comparatively low military spending in Europe is not necessarily a response to a 
supposed adequate and free security protection being provided by the United States, but is rather a 
political choice attributed to entrenched European beliefs about the adequacy of international law to 
promote peace and security.23
“wild west analogy,” where the US is the Sheriff and Europe is the saloonkeeper, and “outlaws shoot sheriffs, not 
saloonkeepers.  In fact, from the saloonkeeper’s point of view, the sheriff trying to impose order by force can 
sometimes be more threatening than the outlaws, who, at least for the time being, may just want a drink.” Id. at 36.  
Similarly, he contrasts a “man armed only with a knife” who “may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a 
tolerable danger,” with “[t]he same man armed with a rifle” who “will likely make a different calculation of what 
constitutes a tolerable risk.”  Id. at 31.  He even attempts to link Saddam Huissen to the September 11 terrorist 
attacks and glosses the fact that no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq.  Id. at 31.
21
 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 53-54 (“Europe today has the wealth and technological capability to make itself more of 
a world power in military terms if Europeans wanted to become that kind of world power.  They could easily spend 
twice as much as they are currently spending on defense if they believed it necessary to do so.”) (emphasis added).  
Similarly, as part of a comprehensive study of European military prospects and economic constraints, researchers at 
RAND Corporation found that “the prevailing European view appears to be that there are realistic opportunities for 
reallocation within existing patterns of military spending and military investments, thereby allowing for shifting 
resources from the existing pool of military procurement without a need for additional resources.  Charles Wolf, Jr., 
Benjamin Zycher, European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid Reaction Force, RAND 
Publication No. MR-1416-OSD/SRF (2001) at 23, online at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1416/
(hereinafter “RAND study”).The RAND study, although cautious in its analysis, nevertheless confirms that Europe 
can, without major policy changes, increase its military budget in accordance with the EU’s European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP):  “[I]f at least one-third of the present allocations for annual military investments is shifted 
and reallocated to the procurement needs associated with the ESDP/RRF, then by 2010 sufficient funding would be 
available to meet the estimated capital costs of the force.  …[S]avings from increased efficiency in the defense 
industry and from movement toward a single defense market in the EU would contribute additionally, if modestly, to 
defraying the necessary capital costs.”  Id.  at 35-36).
22
 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 33.  Kagan commits this same flaw in logic repeatedly.  See, e.g., Id. at 31-32 
(“Europeans like to say that Americans are obsessed with fixing problems, but it is generally true that those with a 
greater capacity to fix problems are more likely to try to fix them than those who have no such capability.”); Id. at 
40 (“Those who cannot act unilaterally themselves naturally want to have a mechanism for controlling those ho 
can.”); Id. at 38 (“Since Europeans lack the capacity to undertake unilateral military actions, either individually or 
collectively as ‘Europe,’ it is natural that they should oppose allowing others to do what they cannot do 
themselves.”).  Kagan also commits the same logical fallacy in reverse, assuming that American military 
participation is a result of American military capacity, instead of a geo-political world view that favors military 
intervention:  “Americans know that when international crises erupt, whether in the Taiwan Strait or in Kashmir, 
they are likely to be the first to become involved.”  Id. at 35.
23
 This is consistent with the premise of liberal international relations theory.  See infra notes 73-76 and 
accompanying text.  Moravcsik, an IR liberal, states that “[a]mong advanced industrial democracies, a stable form of 
interstate politics has emerged, grounded in reliable expectations of peaceful change, domestic rule of law, stable 
international institutions, and intensive societal interaction.  This is the condition Deutsch terms a ‘pluralistic 
7From Kagan’s “intelligent and civilized American neo-conservative”24 viewpoint, it is 
unthinkable that social welfare budgets would ever take priority over defense spending,25 and it is with 
this assumption that Kagan builds his hypothesis that Europe channels its money into social welfare only 
because the United States has eliminated the “primary” concern of security.26  Kagan appears so firmly 
rooted in his beliefs, that he mistakenly attributes them to the Europeans he is attempting to analyze.  As 
Calleo has noted, if the European strategists were operating with American neo-conservative assumptions 
and values, Kagan’s argument based on security and military force would be a plausible explanation for 
European actions.27  But, Europeans are not American neo-conservatives.28  It is equally plausible to take 
their words at face value:  Perhaps Europeans care more about social welfare programs than security,29
and that allocation of relatively smaller military budgets and relatively larger social spending packages in 
Europe is a political choice by the European electorate, influenced by a moral vision about both 
international peace and domestic social welfare which is completely disconnected from US action.30
Rather than the strategic attempt “to capitalize on a sizeable peace dividend” which Kagan portrays,31 it is 
equally plausible that Europeans simply possess different values, that regardless of how much “free 
security community’ and Keohane and Nye term ‘complex interdependence.’”  Andrew Moravcsik, Taking 
Preferences Seriously:  A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INTL. ORG. 513, 535 (1997).
24
 Calleo, supra note 10.
25
 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 54 n. 39 (“Europeans insist that there are certain structural realities in their national 
budgets, built-in limitations to any significant increases in defense spending.  But if Europe were about to be 
invaded, … would they insist nonetheless that their social welfare programs be left untouched?”). 
26
 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 25.
27 Calleo, supra note 10, at 2 (“The role [Kagan] assigns Europe in the newest American century may seem 
satisfactory in Washington and perhaps in London, but it does not appear to go down well in Paris or Berlin, nor in 
Moscow or Beijing.  Kagan's argument nevertheless seems powerful at home, but less because of its conclusions 
than its premises. These premises reflect a variety of interlocking assumptions widely shared among American 
foreign policymakers and analysts. We should be grateful to Kagan for demonstrating these assumptions so 
forcefully and showing just where they lead. Those uneasy with his triumphalist conclusions might therefore start by 
re-examining his triumphalist assumptions.”).
28 Id. (“What Europeans see as prudent self restraint neo-conservative Americans count as pusillanimous 
diffidence.”).
29 Discussing potential funding sources for increased European military activity, researchers at RAND Corporation 
note that a “source could, in principle, be reallocations in existing government budgets from nondefense to defense 
purposes—for example, from … various entitlements. It goes without saying that our European interlocutors were 
even more emphatic in rejecting this option as unrealistic, so we omit it from the discussion.”  RAND study, supra 
note 21 , at 33 (emphasis added).  Similarly, German interlocutors interviewed by RAND corporation as part of a 
comprehensive study on European military prospects and economic constraints “emphasized that paying down 
Germany’s public debt—swollen by the burden of financing reunification costs—is a higher-priority claimant for 
budgetary resources than is any addition to military spending.”  Id. at 23.
30
 This being said, as Europe begins to balance its strong doctrinal power with some form of European defense force, 
see infra Part IV, the political choice of where to allocate funds is also likely to balance more evenly between social 
welfare and defense.  See Robert Graham, France seeks to reassure US over Nato commitment, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003, at 7 (citing French Defense Minister Miche le Alliot-Marie: “Today we have to realise that 
defence spending is not a luxury but a necessity; and you cannot spend one year, then cut back the next.”).
31
 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 25.
8security” the US supposedly provided Europe, Europeans would have made equal or similar allocations 
towards social welfare and away from military spending because that is what they value most.
This choice is illogical if made under Kagan’s assumptions about power and security, but it is 
legitimate if Europeans believe, as the international lawyer does, that cooperation through international 
law actually can prevent armed conflict:  That rules do matter.32  For example, Professor Byers offers an 
alternate explanation why many states, including European states, prefer rules-based power to military 
force:
On occasion [states] may apply raw, unsystematized power in the pursuit of a short-term 
goal. However, the application of raw power promotes instability and escalation, and is 
not particularly subtle or efficient. More frequently, states will apply power within the 
framework of an institution or legal system. States develop and utilize institutions and 
legal systems because they create expectations of behavior, which lessens the risk of 
escalation and facilitates efficiency of action, and because they promote stability, thus 
protecting states which recognize that they could find themselves on the opposite side of 
an issue in future situations.33
Similarly, Professor Hudec notes that “[g]overnments … usually have a longer-term interest in 
the efficacy of the legal relationship they have established with other governments, and so they are more 
inclined to act in ways designed to preserve those relationships. Ultimately, the compliance decisions of 
governments are determined by calculated self-interest [rather] than by force.”34
It is one goal of this book review to show that, rather than operating under American neo-
conservative assumptions that military defense is inviolable, and explaining European action based on this 
assumption, perhaps Europeans are operating with an entirely different assumption altogether:  That the 
best and most lasting guaranty for international peace and security is not military might but cooperation 
32 See, e.g. Kahn, supra note 14, at 4 (“While the Europeans are pursuing a deeper and deeper integration within the 
Union, the American political imagination remains strictly parochial.”).
33
 Byers, supra note 13, at 122 (citing JOHN RAWLS A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43 (1971)).
34
 Robert E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A Developing Country Perspective, in
DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK  81, 82 (Bernard Hoekman et al. eds. 2002). (emphasis 
added).  Similarly, Professor Kritsiotis of the University of Michigan Law School argues that “International law 
offers a much more constructive communicative medium (with all the prospects and risks that this entails) than 
naked power could ever hope to do. Its very rules promise peace; they preach pacifism.   Compared with power, its 
old rival, international law creates the conditions for a genuine peace (based on negotiation and cooperation rather 
than threat, intimidation, and force) and a stable peace (which is protected by law and not by the balance of power). 
This peace is the platform for the prosperity of the system's participants.”  Dino Kritsiotis, Specific Applications: 
The Power of International Law as Language, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 397, 404 (1998).  See also Kahn, supra note 14, 
at 1 (“Both internationally and domestically, political power operates at the origins of law--for example, within 
legislatures or treaty negotiations. But, for both, the move from political disagreement to legal resolution represents 
a shift of norms from inequality to equality. Once the legal rules are set, outcomes should not depend on the relative 
power of the disputants. To identify the operation of political power within an institution of law is to discover a 
"defect," a site at which reform must be pursued if the values of law are to be maintained.”).
9through international law.35  Viewed from this alternate perspective (that of international law), one could 
completely reverse Kagan’s conclusion that a European insistence upon international law has hindered 
US efforts to promote peace militarily.36  Instead, it is equally possible to view the United States as a 
hindrance to European and international efforts to promote peace doctrinally, through Security Council 
vetoes,37 sole no votes in the General Assembly,38 sole no votes in the Human Rights Commission,39
violating Security Council resolutions or other international legal norms,40 weakening the International 
Criminal Court,41 disregarding the pronouncements of the International Court of Justice,42 denying access 
35 See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 14, at 15-16 (“The moral content of international relations is being absorbed by claims 
of legal right, leaving less and less room for a morally driven politics outside of law. The United States still wants a 
moral discourse that is not a legal discourse. To the rest of the world, however, this insistence on both law and 
power looks like a form of a discredited colonial discourse. To them, the resistance of the United States to anything 
that looks like a subordination of its own political center to international legal institutions suggests that human rights 
law may be a continuation of a Cold War political strategy, directed now at the Third World.”).  To his credit, Kagan 
makes this point to some degree:  “Europeans over the past half century have developed a genuinely different 
perspective on the role of power in international relations. … This is a perspective on power that Americans do not 
and cannot share.”  KAGAN, supra note 2, at 55.  But, contrary to a pure international law view finding power in 
rules alone, for Kagan this European perspective on power is always supported by a crutch of American provided 
free-security. 
36
 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 51.
37 US Vetos [sic] on the UN Security Council related to the Middle East , MIDDLE EAST INFORMATION 
CENTER, online at http://middleeastinfo.org/article63.html, accessed Nov. 9, 2003 (“Of the 248 vetoes recorded by 
the five Security Council members since the inception of the United Nations, the United States has cast 73 - the vast 
majority of them related to the Middle East. …. In addition there have been 25 US abstentions on UN Security 
Council resolutions that are condemning Israel.”).
38 WILLIAM BLUM, ROGUE STATE 185-97 (New Updated Ed., 2002) (cataloguing a sample of 144 (margin of 
error < 3) UN General Assembly resolutions between 1978 and 1987 in which the US was either the sole no-vote or 
was accompanied solely by Israel in its opposition.  Additionally, one resolution per year from 1992 to 1999 came to 
a vote on the necessity of ending the economic embargo against Cuba.  In each of these 8 resolutions, the US and 
Israel opposed, occasionally accompanied by Paraguay, Uzbekistan and, once, Albania.).
39 See, e.g., The Right to Food, U.N. GAOR, Comm’n on Human Rts., 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/25 
(2003) & 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/25; The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health,  U.N. GAOR, Comm’n on Human Rts., 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2003/28 (2003) ; World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance and the Comprehensive Implementation of and Follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
Action, U.N. GAOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 59th Sess., E/CN.4/RES/2003/30 (2003).
40 See, e.g., John Quigley, International Law Violations by the United States in the Middle East as a Factor Behind 
Anti-American Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 815 (2002); United States of America:  Hypocracy or Human 
Rights?  Time to Choose, AMNESTY INT’L, AI Index: AMR 51/075/2002 (May 15, 2002) (“On 14 August 2000, 
the day that President Clinton told his party that the USA was the most progressive force for human rights, the UN 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights affirmed that the use of the death penalty 
against child offenders – defendants who were under 18 at the time of the crime – violated customary international 
law.  It called on offending countries to stop the practice. The USA, failing to stand firm for the rule of international 
law, has ignored such calls.”).
41
 See U.S. Proposals to Undermine the International Criminal Court Through a U.N. Security Council Resolution, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 25, 2002, online at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/usproposal.htm; The 
United States and the International Criminal Court, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, accessed Nov. 8, 2003, online at 
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/us.htm; Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, American Law in a Time of 
Global Interdependence:  U.S. national Reports to the XIVth International Congress of Comparative Law:  Section 
IV: The United States of America and the International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (2002); Joel F. 
England, NOTE: The Response of the United States to the International Criminal Court: Rejection, Ratification or 
10
to UN Special Rapporteurs,43 and failing to ratify44 or severely limiting the effect of45 human rights 
treaties.  From this international law perspective, far from painting the US as the “key,” allowing Europe 
to pursue its agenda of international law, the US is rather the biggest obstacle – through passive ignorance 
or active sabotage – of an international legal order to which an increasing number of states subscribe.46
Something Else? 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 941 (2001); Christopher M. Van de Kieft, NOTE: Uncertian Risk:  
The United States Military and the International Criminal Court, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2325 (2002); Eric P. 
Schwartz, The United States and the International Criminal Court: The Case for "Dexterous Multilateralism", 4 
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Against this background, Europe’s position is aptly summarized in the draft European Constitution, which 
“says the transatlantic relationship is ‘irreplaceable’ but also says the United Nations charter is ‘the 
fundamental framework for international relations.’”47
Like any scholar, Kagan approaches his analysis from a particular angle and with certain biases.  
Certainly, approaching these same issues from the perspective of international law is no less biased.  But 
it is definitely complementary, a complementarity upon which quality scholarship depends.  A weak point 
in Kagan’s book, therefore, is the lack of discussion surrounding his disciplinary biases and the missed 
opportunity to enhance his text by providing, and then refuting, alternative views.  This section has 
attempted to provide this missing complementarity by re-examining the concept of power and policy 
choices related to it from an alternate perspective.  Kagan would most certainly find fault in this analysis, 
and international lawyers could have learned a great deal had he included, and effectively refuted, the 
international law perspective.
III. The World Beyond Kagan’s Realism
As explored supra Part II, the notion of “power” in Kagan’s work is essentially limited to that 
power supported by military force.48    By repeatedly pairing the terms “international law” and “power” in 
syntactic opposition, he implicitly rejects that international law, outside Europe, is powerful at all.49  This 
conception of law and power as opposites must be taken for what it is, the limited view of one particular 
school of international relations:  realism.  This post-World War II discipline, dominated by scholars such 
as Hans Morgenthau,50 George Kennan, Georg Schwarzenberger, Reinhold Niebuhr, Arnold Wolfers and 
Robert Strausz-Hupe,51 “believed … in the polarity of law and power, opposing one to the other as the 
want to enter, even though entry will require a reordering of the relationship among the conceptions of state, 
sovereignty, and law. Much of Latin America, too, has experienced a disgust with the politics of the nation and is 
turning toward a world of markets and international law. For many who distrust their own national politics--a wholly 
justified distrust in many parts of the world--the promise of international law is its restraint on these domestic 
political forces.”).
47 Thomas Fuller, EU Leaders Agree on Defense Policy, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE (Dec 13-14, 2003) at 1.
48
 Whereas Kagan consistently downplays political and economic power to military power, they are at least 
acknowledged as form of power in their own right, albeit insubstantial ones.  KAGAN, supra note 2, at 21 (“in 
economic and political realms, the European Union produced miracles.”); Id. at 48 (“For all Europe’s great 
economic power and for all its success at achieving political union, Europe’s military weakness … produced 
diplomatic weakness and sharply diminished its political influence compared to that of the United States.”).
49
 KAGAN, supra note 2, 73 (describing Europe’s preference for international law as a “rejection of power politics” 
rather than a different form of power”); Id. at 95 (implying military power when stating that “Americans … remain 
realists in the limited sense that they still believe in the necessity of power in a world that remains far from 
perfection.”); Id. at 65 (equating “military power” and “global rule,” which are contrasted to “European 
integration.”); Id. at 41 (“Europeans hope to contain American power without wielding power themselves.”).
50
 Reus-Smit, supra note 19, at 581 (citing HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS:  THE 
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 5-18 (6th Ed., 1985)).
51
 Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory:  A Dual Agenda, 87 A.J.I.L. 
205, 207 n. 5 (1993).
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respective emblems of the domestic versus the international realm, normative aspiration versus positive 
description, cooperation versus conflict, soft versus hard, idealist versus realist.  Regardless of their 
domestic colors, states in the international realm were champions only of their own national interest.  
‘Law,’ as understood in the domestic sense, had no place in this world.  The only relevant laws were the 
‘laws of politics,’ and politics was ‘a struggle for power.’”52  Thus, Kagan’s point about the relevance of 
international law in a world dominated by US hegemony is a well-worn one:  the post World-War II 
realists were challenging the utility of international law in a world they (like Kagan) viewed as controlled 
by power politics long before “Of Paradise and Power.”  But, what Kagan does not acknowledge is the 
rich scholarly dialogue which resulted from this original realist challenge, in which international lawyers 
responded to the realists,53 neo-realists responded to them,54 and regime theorists responded to the neo-
realists,55 all of which has been concisely documented by Anne Marie-Slaughter56 and Christian Reus-
Smit.57
Without placing his realist ideology in this greater historical context, not only is it difficult for 
Kagan to claim impartiality, but he is unable to respond to the gamut of post-realist ideologies, some of 
which have challenged realism significantly.58 For example, by proving through empirical evidence in 
particular international crises that international law could have verifiable compliance effect, scholars such 
as Abram Chayes's forced realists to reconsider their premise that international law was irrelevant to state 
52 Id. at 207 (citing HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER 
AND PEACE 4-5, 25-26 (4th ed. 1967)).
53
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from Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell of the Yale Law School, who “reinvented international jurisprudence, 
creating a comprehensive framework within which international lawyers, retrained as public policy experts, could 
use empirical data and theoretical insights from political science and a range of other disciplines to ascertain and 
critique existing law … to determine which law, or which system of laws, best furthers ‘human dignity.’”  Slaughter 
Burley, supra note 51, at 209-211.  Some of McDougal's students, particularly Richard Falk, Saul Mendlovitz and 
Burns Weston, expanded this work “from the perspective less of human dignity than of systemic stability.”  Id. at 
211-212.  
54
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AND WORLD POLITICS (1972); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE 
POWER 174 (1989)).
56
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 For a complete examination of the evolution of IR scholarship see Friedrich Kratochwil & John G. Ruggie, 
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depth treatments of regime theory, see STEPHEN D. KRASNER, ED., INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1983); 
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behavior.59  Louis Henkin made the same point more broadly, arguing in his canonical work How Nations 
Behave that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time.”60
At the same time realism was being challenged, however, international lawyers were forced to 
admit that state compliance, although common, is not guaranteed, causing them to “de-emphasis[e] … the 
constraint function of international law.”61   Indeed, this would seem the downfall of international law, if 
it were not for the development of regime theory.  Keeping consistent with realist premises, Robert 
Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalist theory of regimes explains the “pervasiveness and persistence” of 
norms (“regimes” in IR speak62) in international politics, arguing that because regimes lower transaction 
costs, increase information, reduce cheating, enhance the value of reputation and facilitate monitoring, 
they are useful to and frequently followed by self-interested utility maximizing states.63   The net result of 
this was that, although rules may not matter quite as much as international lawyers would have hoped in 
59
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international trade, international adjudication, international human rights, and international environmental law. 
Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay: Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.J. 2599, n. 2 (1997)
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the compliance sense, regime theory showed them to matter more than previously acknowledged in the 
strategic sense.64  The seed was planted for an ongoing marriage between IL and IR.65
Viewing international law as a mere tool in IR strategizing is a dismal future for the discipline, 
however.  In this regard, the most interesting scholarship being carried on today analyzes IR and IL not as 
complementary but as synergistic.66  Rather than viewing IL as a tool for IR, like institutionalists (regime 
theorists), the “new generation of interdisciplinary scholars[]”67 view both fields as inseparably 
intertwined.  One of the most interesting works is by Professor Michael Byers, who attempts “to 
synthesize the two perspectives into a general theory of customary international law.”68 Byers seeks to 
64
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regimes with IL scholars’ understandings of the functions and benefits of international law).
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“explain[] the process of customary international law as a social institution created and shaped by the 
shared understandings and patterned behavior of self-interested states. According to this theory, 
customary rules largely arise through the application of power by states within a framework made up of 
the customary process and a number of fundamental structural principles of international law.”69  His use 
of customary international law is a particularly interesting avenue to simultaneously approach the 
disciplines of international law and international relations, because it shows, unlike Kagan, the different 
ways in which power is manifested in or created by international law.  Byers  “seeks to bring the study of 
power within the scope of international legal scholarship in a way that does not deny an important 
element of stability and determinacy to law. It might also encourage some international relations scholars 
to regard international law as a constraint on the exercise of power which cannot be ignored or changed in 
response to short-term interests.”70  After analyzing four fundamental principles of international law -- the 
principle of jurisdiction, the principle of personality, the principle of reciprocity, and the principle of 
legitimate expectation71 -- Byers finds in direct opposition to Kagan’s view that “the customary process 
and certain fundamental structural principles of international law act to qualify applications of state 
power.72
Another powerful integrationist effort is the liberal school.  Led by Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Andrew Moravcsik, and a combined effort by Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood, these 
scholars have sought to explain how “state-society relations—the relationship of states to the domestic 
and transnational social context in which they are embedded—have a fundamental impact on state 
behavior in world politics.”73    They believe that “the configuration of state preferences matters most in 
world politics—not, as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities and not, as institutionalists (that is, 
ambivalent, and opposing behavior.  Power, and its relational nature, is therefore particularly important in the 
process of customary international law.”  Id
69
 Byers, supra note 13, at 111.  See also Kritsiotis, supra note 34, at 402 (“Through the use of the law as language, 
we can then identify strands of opinio juris thought in state behavior (that is, incidents in state practice) - an essential 
legal ingredient in the creation of custom which, in turn, produces a normative system more reflective of the 
interests of its addressees. With its extraordinary dynamic and adaptability, custom is especially appropriate as a 
dialect of international law for allowing states to respond to complex emergencies or unanticipated crises, or perhaps 
to depart from treaty texts when appropriate.”).
70
 Byers, supra note 13, at 111.  
71 Id. at 149-79.
72 Id. at 180.  Reaching this result, Byers notes that “International relations scholars who have previously dismissed 
and derided the role of international law may wish to reevaluate the accuracy of their essentially anarchical picture 
of international society. Similarly, for those international relations scholars who have begun to explore the role of 
international institutions and international law, the ideas expressed in this article may confirm their intuitions and 
encourage them to join international lawyers in a cooperative study of the complex issues which separate, yet bind, 
international politics to international law.”  Id. 
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functional regime theorists) maintain, the configuration of information and institutions.”74   By attaching 
state preferences to individual preferences through domestic political systems, liberals have attempted to 
explain several notable IR phenomena, including the “democratic peace,” or absence of war between 
democratic states.75  The liberalist premise is integrationist because of its emphasis on the causal 
importance of norms in IR, albeit from a “bottom up” rather than “top down” perspective.76
Professor Reus-Smit brings the discussion to another level, positing that because integrationist 
theories such as Slaughter’s are “proudly positive and explicitly eschew normative reflection,” it 
“amounts not to bridge-building but to an attempt to draw international law across the river on to the turf 
of American political science, in the process losing much of what is distinctive and important about 
international legal theory.”77  In essence, Reus-Smit has accused Slaughter and her colleagues of the same 
offense the institutionalists had committed, trivializing international law by grounding an integrationist 
theory too firmly in the assumptions of political science.78  He contrasts this approach to the works of 
inter-war pre-realist scholars.  For example, although the prominent inter-war IR theorist E.H. Carr, 
“traditionally understood to have called for a science of international politics … purged of the utopianism 
of Wilsonian internationalism,”79 is often considered the nemesis of Norman Angell, who is portrayed as 
a “naive liberal internationalist,”80 an effort to combine realism and normativity was in fact at the heart of 
both of their philosophies.  Contrary to Carr’s reputation as a strict realist, he in fact “called for a science 
of international politics that blended realism and utopianism.”81 According to Carr, “international 
relations will never be a `mature' science until it recognizes the need to bring the empirical and the 
normative into dialogue.”82  Similarly, contrary to common portrayal, Angell was not ignorant of power 
politics, firmly recognizing the need to compromise realist and utopian tendencies:
It seems fatally easy to secure either one of two kinds of action: that of the `practical man' 
who limits his energies to securing a policy which will perfect the machinery of war, and 
disregard anything else; or that of the pacifist, who, persuaded of the brutality or 
74
 Moravcsik, supra note 23, at 513.
75
 Slaughter Burley, supra note 51, at 225-26.
76
 In other words, the liberalist school emphasizes the influence of domestic norms and preferences on IR, not the 
influence of IL on domestic norms.
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 Reus-Smit, supra note 19, at 590.
78 Id. at 590. (claiming that Slaughter’s strategy “has been to work out from a particular model of political science 
and conception of politics, and to treat legal institutions, processes and norms as empirical data to be explained. … 
The result is a liberal international legal theory that makes good political science, at least from the perspective of the 
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international relations theory lacks the philosophical resources to inform the articulation of a mature liberal theory of 
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79 Id. at 577.
80 Id. at 578.
81 Id. at 573.
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 E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS:  1919-1939, at 10 (2nd Ed., 1946) (cited in Reus-Smit, supra note 
19, at 577).
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immortality of war, just leaves it at that, implying that national defence is of no concern 
of his. What is needed is the type of activity which will include both halves of the 
problem... To concentrate on either half to the exclusion of the other half is to render the 
whole problem insoluble.83
According to Reus-Smit, the reason these two philosophically opposed scholars could find so 
much common ground was because, in the inter-war period, the underlying assumption of all theorists
was that political theory had to take account of both the instrumental and the moral.84  After World War 
II, however, “there [was] a shift away from the orientation of classical international theories, which 
confronted the political in all of its … complexities, towards `neo-theories' of both realist and liberal 
varieties, which have reduced international relations to instrumental rationality, effectively abandoning 
political inquiry, and forgone normative argument, abrogating political engagement.”85  Reus-Smit argues 
that, rather than attempting to conceptualize IL with a post-war IR lacking a normative 
dimension, a true integrationist theory must re-espouse the conception of politics as a socially 
constitutive normative enterprise “that mediates between individual and group self-interest and utility, on 
the one hand, and ethical conceptions of what is right and good, on the other.”86  Although some would 
claim it unrealistic or even anachronistic to revert to a 70-year-old political dialogue,87 Reus-Smit’s effort 
to more carefully refine the integrationist project is outstanding, and will surely provide insight to many 
future integrationist scholars.  
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s “community of courts” paradigm goes a long way to answering Reus-
Smit’s critique.  The “community of courts” model posits that whereas European and American foreign 
policy may be moving farther apart, their judicial systems are increasingly in dialogue,88  Increased 
83
 NORMAN ANGELL, THE GREAT ILLUSION 327-38 (1933) (cited in Reus-Smit, supra note 19, at 579).
84
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judicial comity, “deference not to foreign law or foreign national interests, but specifically to foreign 
courts,”89 could allow for an honest treatment of both IR and IL.  Through deference, judicial comity does 
not lose sight of subtle political relationships characteristic of IR.  At the same time, it is carried out by 
courts expounding law, thus maintaining the normative influence of IL.  The US judicial system, both in 
the lower courts and in the Supreme Court, is increasingly recognizing both international and foreign 
law.90  The most striking example of this is the US Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas, citing several opinions of the European Court of Human Rights.91  US Supreme Court judges are 
also meeting with their European colleagues, both from national constitutional courts and the ECJ, with 
increasing regularity.  Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has led Supreme Court delegations to meet with their 
counterparts in France, Germany and England, and there have been two official meetings between the 
U.S. Supreme Court and the ECJ, one in 1998 in Brussels and another in 2000 in Washington.92  In a very 
telling move, Chief Justice Rehnquist recently created a branch of the federal judiciary exclusively 
dealing with foreign policy issues, with the stated purpose to "coordinate the federal judiciary's 
relationship with foreign judiciaries and with official and unofficial agencies and organizations interested 
in international judicial relations and the establishment and expansion of the rule of law and 
administration of justice."93  The combination of these events represent a substantial change in American 
relations both with Europe and the international community from the standpoint of judicial deference.  
Recognizing these events provides a fuller picture of the Euro-American relationship.
Thus, the fields of IR and IL have grown and developed significantly since the IR realists and IL 
utopians of the post-war period talked past each other.  In addition to the important recognizition of IL 
brought to IR by regime theory, the past decade has brought a new wave of scholars working to unite the 
two disciplines. Kagan bypasses all of these new developments, proposing an analysis stuck in post-
World War II realism.  By restating the post World War II realist argument without acknowledging the 
subsequent responses by neo-realists, regime theorists, liberals, or others, Kagan’s work is narrowly 
revisionist.
89 Id. at 1112-13.
90 Id. at 166-69.  See also  Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of 
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 819 (1999) (“[E]xtensive and detailed treatments of 
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91
 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481-2483 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v United Kingdom , 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. 
(1981); P. G. & J. H. v United Kingdom , App. No. 00044787/98, P 56 (Eur. Ct. H. R., Sept. 25, 2001); Modinos v 
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IV. Kagan’s Book as Integrationist Contribution
In the chapters The Postmodern Paradise and The World America Made, Kagan proposes the 
central thesis of his book, that “Europe’s evolution into its present state occurred under the mantle of the 
U.S. security guarantee and could not have occurred without it.”94  Although it is difficult to fully 
substantiate Kagan’s claim that Europe’s international legal regime developed “but for” special 
circumstances such as US-provided security, he is right to point out the extent to which Europe has relied 
on US security and the extent to which it will need to outgrow this reliance if it is to complement its ever-
more-important doctrinal strength.95  It is this compelling hypothesis perhaps more than anything else that 
caused Kagan’s essay and then book to raise so many eyebrows in international law and policy circles.     
Rather than view Kagan’s assertions as challenges to the IL-focused European premise, it is more 
constructive to view them as an integrationist refinement on the current successful European international 
legal regime.  Kagan’s book could challenge international lawyers to more carefully consider the ways in 
which military and doctrinal power interact.  It is premature to say, as international lawyers might, that 
there is no place in today’s global society for military force.  Yet, it is also wrong to claim, as Kagan 
does, that doctrinal/political force is a hollow shell without military force to back it up.  Today’s Europe 
disproves both of these notions, providing a third paradigm, where both military and doctrinal force 
matter (contrary to the view of international lawyers), but where doctrinal force was the condition 
precedent to military force and not the other way around (contrary to the realist view).  
Europe’s political and doctrinal strength and legitimacy has been steadily growing since the 
formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951.96  Only in recent months, however, has 
Europe begun to seriously attack the question of common security as a step towards further political 
94
 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 72.  For example, Kagan argues that “[few] like to recall that the military destruction of 
Nazi Germany was the prerequisite for the European peace that followed.”  KAGAN, supra note 2, at 56.  Similarly, 
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choose normative power.  Whereas Part II is an argument about political choice, the argument explored in this Part 
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95 See Anthony Browne, Rory Watson and David Charter, European leaders deny defence threat to NATO, THE 
TIMES (London), Oct. 18, 2003, at 4 (noting that Silvio Berlusconi, the Prime Minister of Italy, which currently 
holds the presidency of the European Council, said that … “The European Union can't play a central role on the 
world stage without the back-up of an appropriate and adequate military force - it's inconceivable that Britain could 
be a world power with an autonomous military capacity," and that "No diplomacy can exist without military 
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96 See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 167.
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cohesion.  Silvio Berlusconi, Prime Minister of Italy, which currently holds the presidency of the 
European Council noted that “apparently, all the EU countries are aware that there cannot be any genuine 
foreign policy if there is not also a European military capability that is independent and complementary to 
NATO.”97  Similarly, French President Jacques Chirac stated that “There is no Europe if it does not have 
the capacity to defend itself.”98
Examples of increased European military planning and activity are multiplying rapidly.  The first-
ever independent European peacekeeping forces were launched last May in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo.99  Perhaps more importantly from the standpoint of geo-politics are the current discussions 
aimed at establishing a European force beyond peacekeeping missions capable of operating independently 
of NATO.100  Whereas other areas, particularly voting allocations, have stalled talks to draft Europe’s 
Constitution,101 the delegates to the intergovernmental Conference (IGC) have agreed on the provisions of 
the Constitution establishing a common defense policy separate from NATO.102  These changes are a 
marked break from the political choice to avoid military strength, discussed supra Part II, and lay waste to 
97 Inter-Governmental Conference:  Presidency/Parliament/Commission in United Front on Institutions, 
EUROPEAN REPORT (Oct. 25, 2003).
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100 See William Pfaff, A history lesson for the allies: NATO's future, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 23, 
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2003, at 13-14; Thomas Fuller And Brian Knowlton, Europeans try to reassure U.S. on NATO, supra note 98; 
Thomas Fuller And Brian Knowlton, Europe allies try to reassure U.S.:  They say NATO won't be undercut, INT’L 
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“the leaders of Europe's 'big three' -- France, Germany and Britain -- agreed on a joint paper which sketches plans 
for the new initiative.  The joint paper stated that the EU ‘should be endowed with a joint capacity to plan and 
conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources and capabilities.’”).
101 See infra note 122.
102
 Fuller, supra note 47.  See also Dale, supra note 99 ; NATO Row, supra note 100 (“defence plans [are] linked to 
talks on a first-ever constitution for the enlarging bloc”); John Tagliabue, Blair reassures U.S. on European defense, 
supra note 100 (noting that “European constitution … proposes, among other measures, the establishment of the 
office of European foreign minister, who would be broadly responsible for foreign and security policy.”); Inter-
governmental Conference:  Silvio Berlusconi Pledges to Secure Institutional Compromise in December, 
EUROPEAN REPORT 2812 (Oct. 18, 2003).
21
Kagan’s claim that “[t]oday, the European Union is no closer to fielding an independent force, even a 
small one, than it was three years ago.”103
The American government has become increasingly worried about these events.  It views the 
proposal to locate the EU force’s headquarters outside Brussels (NATO headquarters) as a serious threat 
to trans-Atlantic relations.104  The increased concern shown by the US government about European 
military development is difficult to square with Kagan’s final chapter, in which he presents increased 
European military capabilities as a solution to the transatlantic divide.105  The current trans-Atlantic 
tension over a European force is evidence that, rather than acting to preserve “the West,” as Kagan 
predicts it would,106 such a force will only increase the extent that the US and Europe are becoming 
“positively estranged.”107  And, whereas Kagan predicts that, amidst this divide, the US will choose to 
ignore a Europe for which it no longer has any use,108 it instead appears that the US is very much paying 
attention.109
In conclusion, although this book review has been critical of the manner in which Kagan ignores 
doctrinal power, it admits that international lawyers risk committing just as big a gaffe by ignoring other 
forms of power, such as military force.  Professor Anne Orford notes that international lawyers are 
already recognizing alternate forms of power to an increasing extent:  “The structure of international 
argument has swung between apologetic or pragmatic approaches to the fact that international lawyers 
have to be realistic about where power lies and idealistic approaches that make great claims for the 
103 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 53.  Even at the time Kagan wrote his book, his claim was spurious.  In 2001, the 
RAND study stated that “[t]hrough NATO and the DCI [Defense Capability Initiative], and through the ESDP 
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EU, have expressed their intention and commitment to enhance Europe’s military capabilities. The result of their 
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circumstances warrant, a capacity for independent action by the EU.”  RAND study, supra note 21, at 3.
104
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possibility that international law can constrain such power.”110  This is a positive trend, and to the extent 
that Kagan’s book adds to the integrationist literature, it is a valuable tool for the international legal 
scholar.
V. Conclusion:  The European-American Rift as 
Integrationist Project
Kagan cautions against the idealist European who fails to acknowledge the unique geo-political 
conditions that led to the rise of the European Union.111  Yet, he risks committing the same error himself 
by focusing solely on these factors, unnecessarily downplaying the resulting international legal regime.112
For example, he claims that “the early promise of the ‘new’ Europe. … bonding together into a single 
political and economic unit … to recapture Europe’s old greatness in a new political form  [as] … the 
next superpower,”113 has been unfulfilled.  But, to the international lawyer, the new Europe has made the 
world is a very different place indeed.  Whereas Kagan carries on for several pages about the “decline of 
Europe into relative military weakness,”114 the international lawyer is equally impressed by its relative 
doctrinal strength.  Europe is now building a norm-based international society (and encouraging other 
countries to do the same) without the help of (or even in opposition to) the United States.115  The 
European Union, what began as a simple treaty between nations over coal and steel tariffs just a half 
century ago,116 has quickly become the world’s “leading example of actual organic integration.”117    Now, 
the European Union stands apart as the quintisencial model of all that international law can be, the EU 
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treaties representing “some sort of 'third way' between the strictures of both national and international 
law.”118
After downplaying European doctrinal power throughout the book, Kagan finally recognizes the 
potential global influence of these European changes towards the end of book, in his chapter Is it Still 
‘The West?’  In that chapter, Kagan notes that, as European strategy focuses increasingly around the EU 
and less around NATO, it becomes progressively more difficult to view Europe and the United States as a 
cohesive unit under such titles as “The West.”119  His questions about the possible future of this divide 
created by a doctrinally strong Europe and a militarily strong US will likely prove to be the book’s most 
lasting contribution.  But, his answers are heavily value-laden with his realist premise.120  Whereas Kagan 
views Europe as destined to merely “follow where America leads,”121 the international lawyer, concerned 
with international doctrinal power, views Europe as the leader.  Endogenously, this power manifests itself 
in the project for a European Constitution and the development a common strategic and defense policy.122
Exogenously, this power is evident as Europe prepares to expand from 15 to 25 members, exercises 
substantial control over policy decisions in the growing number of EU candidate countries,123 increases its 
use of powerful association agreements,124 and continues to exercise tremendous power over its former 
colonial holdings in Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and elsewhere.   William Pfaff notes that “American neo-
118
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conservatives, … who formerly dismissed the EU as a grouping of over-regulated and non-competitive 
economies, now have begun to issue warnings against ‘superpower Europe.’”125
Against these developments, Kagan’s claim of “insecurity in the European claim to success”126
seem difficult to substantiate.  There is no question that Europe exercises substantial global power.127
This power may not be as strong as that possessed by the United States, and it certainly manifests in a 
different form, but it is undeniably present.  Rather than becoming mired in a discussion over which form 
of power is superior, the way forward is to recognize the important interaction of various forms of power, 
military, doctrinal, or otherwise.  Kagan has presented his work in the narrow former sense, but it could 
equally be used in the broader sense, as an integrationist tool.  This is no easy task, but a group of 
committed scholars are meeting the challenge, merging the two disciplines with particular finesse and 
discretion.  Kagan’s work, somewhat ironically, can add to this discourse.
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